The issue
Why the Internet can be switched off
Four routes to the Internet: terrestrial networks, cut by state order; satellite terminals, which depend on whether the operator complies with local licensing (it rarely does not, as in Iran and Sudan); today’s direct-to-cell, still under the local carrier’s control; and next-generation direct-to-cell, a potential to consider within a rights-based vision, if the rules allow.
01
Terrestrial Internet
Cut by state order
Fixed broadband and mobile networks pass through a small number of licensed operators and exchange points. A government orders them to stop routing traffic, and they comply.
02
Satellite terminals
Depends on the operator
A dish talks to the satellite directly, but service still exists at the operator’s discretion. Operators normally comply with national licensing requirements: where a state has not authorised their service, they switch it off. In rare cases, such as Iran and Sudan, an operator has kept serving terminals without the state’s authorisation. That is not universal, and it is the operator’s choice, not a protection: it can be withdrawn.
Our askProtect this access and expand it to more Internet shutdown contexts, so that it no longer depends on one operator’s choice. See the Policy Agenda
03
Today’s direct-to-cell
Still under the local carrier’s control
Today’s services run on frequencies licensed to a domestic mobile carrier and extend that carrier’s network. They need the carrier’s partnership and national authorisation, so the same order can switch them off.
04
Next-generation direct-to-cell
A potential to consider
The next generation runs on dedicated satellite spectrum and does not technically need a local carrier. That makes it a potential to consider, not a guarantee: whether it could reach people under shutdown depends on the rules being set at WRC-27, and on building it around a rights-based vision of connectivity, accountable to the people it serves.
Our askKeep the rules at WRC-27 open, so this potential is not closed off before it exists. See the Policy Agenda
In most countries, all Internet traffic passes through a small number of licensed operators and exchange points. A government that wants a shutdown orders them to stop routing traffic, and they comply.
Shutdowns are now routine. In 2025, Access Now and the #KeepItOn coalition documented 313 shutdowns in 52 countries, the highest annual total on record (Access Now). They are also more targeted: throttling during protests, blocking platforms, cutting mobile data while fixed lines stay up, and, when it suits the authorities, cutting everything.
As people have turned to satellite connectivity to stay online, states have followed. Access Now recorded 14 attacks on Low Earth Orbit satellite services across seven countries in 2025, against four in 2024. Possession of satellite equipment is criminalised in several countries, and terminals can be located, jammed and seized.
The rules matter as much as the hardware. Under the ITU’s Radio Regulations, no station may operate without a licence from the country in which it transmits. That principle exists to prevent interference between networks. It is now being used against the people a shutdown cuts off. Since 2023, Iran has complained to the ITU’s Radio Regulations Board about Starlink service on its territory. In March 2026, during Iran’s wartime blackout, the Board urged Norway and the United States to have the operator disable its transmissions within Iran, and encouraged Tehran to identify and deactivate the terminals (Digital Medusa) (ITU).
The UN’s human rights office has warned that some states invoke the ITU’s own Constitution as legal cover for shutdowns, and has backed a call for the ITU to make clear that its provisions should never be understood as authorising Internet shutdowns (OHCHR, 2022).
The coalition’s position is simple. Protection from harmful interference is legitimate and should stay. A power to switch off satellite connectivity by withholding authorisation, used to cut a population off, is not.
Routes to satellite access
Satellite connectivity is not one technology. Each route reaches people differently, and each can be cut off in different ways. Our work focuses on two of them.
Satellite terminals
- What people need
- A dish or terminal, power and open sky
- What it carries
- Broadband
- Reach under a shutdown
- Works where terminals get in, but few, costly and visible
- Main risks
- Seizure, jamming, detection, prosecution
Direct-to-cell
- What people need
- An ordinary phone. Today’s services work on many phones already in use; the next generation needs new chipsets, arriving from 2027.
- What it carries
- Today, texts and light data where mobile coverage runs out. Later generations could carry more, but feasibility studies are needed to show how much.
- Reach under a shutdown
- Potentially millions, if the rules and commitments allow
- Main risks
- Depends on carrier and authorisation rules; transmissions can be detected
Early versions: satellite messaging on some smartphones already carries short texts, but only in countries the phone maker switches it on.
Satellite terminals are what kept Iran partly connected in 2026. They are also the target of a fight at the ITU over whether operators must stop serving terminals in countries that have not authorised them (see The Window).
Direct-to-cell removes the terminal. It comes in two generations, and the difference matters:
- Today’s services run on frequencies licensed to a domestic mobile carrier and extend that carrier’s network. They work on many phones already in use, but need the carrier’s partnership and national authorisation. Where a government would never allow that, this route is closed.
- The next generation runs on dedicated satellite spectrum and does not technically need a local carrier. Phones need new chipsets, arriving from 2027, and manufacturers need to enable the bands in every market. This is the version that could reach people under shutdown at scale.
Other routes
Other routes exist. They are outside our main focus, but they matter:
- Satellite phones and handheld messengers carry calls and texts, but their signals can be traced. A US court found that Syrian forces tracked journalists in Homs in 2012, including Marie Colvin, through intercepted satellite phone signals (Colvin v. Syrian Arab Republic, 2019).
- Shared terminals connect a building or neighbourhood over Wi-Fi or a local mesh network, so more people get online, while the owner carries the risk.
- One-way satellite broadcast sends files and news over ordinary satellite TV. Nothing is transmitted, so there is no signal to trace, but it cannot carry anything out, and the dishes themselves are visible. Toosheh, run by NetFreedom Pioneers, used it to reach people in Iran during the 2026 shutdowns.
We are clear about the limits of every route:
- Capacity is finite. A satellite beam covers a large area and its capacity is shared. In a crisis this means messaging, voice and light data for many people, not broadband for everyone.
- Gateways and operators still matter. Traffic reaches the Internet through ground stations, and service exists at an operator’s discretion. Who operates it, and on what commitments, matters as much as the technology.
- Use carries risk. Transmissions can be detected, and some states punish possession or use. Safety has to be designed in from the start.
No single route or provider is the answer. Resilience comes from several, governed by rules that do not hand states an off switch.
