Our approach
Pragmatic human rights advocacy for a more resilient Internet.
We ground our work in the experiences and needs of people most affected by Internet shutdowns. We examine the political, social and economic dimensions of connectivity, assess technological opportunities and risks, and develop practical solutions that are safer, more accessible and accountable.
01
Start with people
02
Understand the context
03
Assess opportunities and risks
04
Turn analysis into solutions
05
Build for long-term impact
01
Start with people
Whose access is disrupted, who bears the consequences, and whose needs shape the response?
We centre the needs and experiences of people most affected by Internet shutdowns.
In Iran in 2026, smuggled satellite terminals carried out much of the evidence the world saw. But terminals were scarce outside wealthier areas, and from smaller cities and poorer provinces such as Sistan and Baluchestan, almost nothing got out.
People most affected by shutdowns are sources of expertise, not beneficiaries. Their experiences should define the problem, shape the solutions, test whether they work, and hold them to account.
02
Understand the context
What political, social and economic conditions decide who can connect and who is excluded?
Terminals cost thousands of dollars, could be found and seized, and reached few people. Satellite access has to reach everyone, including where satellite operators will not cross the authorities.
Who can connect depends on more than technology: cost, location, legal risk and the chance of being caught all shape access. In Iran, the people least able to afford a terminal were also the least able to get evidence out. We analyse each context on its own terms, and do not treat Iran, Sudan or anywhere else as interchangeable.
03
Assess opportunities and risks
Who controls the technology, who can access it, what data it exposes, and how it can be restricted or misused?
- Capacity is finite. A satellite beam covers a large area and its capacity is shared. In a crisis this means messaging, voice and light data for many people, not broadband for everyone.
- Gateways and operators still matter. Traffic reaches the Internet through ground stations, and service exists at an operator’s discretion. Who operates it, and on what commitments, matters as much as the technology.
- Use carries risk. Transmissions can be detected, and some states punish possession or use. Safety has to be designed in from the start.
04
Turn analysis into solutions
What concrete policy, regulatory, technical and operational pathways follow?
Back solutions, not only critique. Naming problems while validating existing systems will not produce different results. We welcome productive criticism, but general condemnations of Internet shutdowns are not enough without solutions that account for the lives of the people affected.
Our ask in regulatory forums is narrow and technical. Keep every protection against harmful interference. Do not add obligations that let a state switch off satellite connectivity to its population by withholding authorisation.
05
Build for long-term impact
What safeguards, accountability, accessibility and affordability make it last?
Our longer-term aim is for crisis connectivity to work as rights-protective public infrastructure: governed in the public interest and accountable to the people it serves, not dependent on the goodwill of private companies or the favour of any one state.
